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Abstract: Many types of system operate for missions that are made up of several phases. For the complete
mission to be a success, the system must operate successfully during each of the phases. Examples of such
systems include an aircraft  ight, and also many military operations for both aircraft and ships. An aircraft
mission could be considered as the following phases: taxiing to the runway, take-off, climbing to the correct
altitude, cruising, descending, landing and taxiing back to the terminal. Component failures can occur at any
point during the mission, but their conditionmay only be critical for one particular phase. As such, it may be
that the transition from one phase to another is the critical event leading to mission failure, and the
component failures resulting in the system failure may have occurred during some previous phase. This
paper describes a means of analysing the reliability of non-repairable systems that undergo phased missions.
Fault tree analysis (FTA) has been used as a method for assessing the system performance. The results of the
analysis are the system failure modes in each phase (minimal cut sets), the failure probability in each phase
and the total mission unreliability. To increase the ef ciency of the analysis, the fault trees constructed to
represent the system failure logic are analysed using a modularization method. Binary decision diagrams
(BDDs) are then employed to quantify the likelihood of failure in each phase.
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1 INTRODUCTION
If the success of a mission is reliant upon a sequential set of
objectives operating over different time intervals, it may be
referred to as a phased mission. During the execution of the
phases in a mission, the system is altered such that the logic
model, system con guration or system failure characteristics
may change to accomplish a different objective. The phases
in a mission may be expressed in terms of phase number,
time interval, system con guration, task(s) to be under-
taken, performance measure(s) of interest and maintenance
policy. This type of mission can be characterized as a sequ-
ence of discrete events required to complete a task, e.g. an
aircraft  ight phase pattern.
In order to identify possible causes of phase and mission
failure, a method is required to express how combinations
of component failures (basic events) can occur during the
phases throughout the mission and cause system failure.
These failure events then require quanti cation to enable the
likelihood and frequency of mission failure to be determined.
The main techniques that have previously been imple-
mented for the solution to phased mission problems are that
of fault tree analysis (FTA), Markov analysis and simulation.
The technique of fault tree analysis is a commonly used tool
to assess the probability of failure of industrial systems. This
method may be adapted for analysis of systems comprising
more than one phase, where each phase depends on a
different logic model. Hence, the complexity of the model-
ling is signi cantly more dif cult than for single-phase
systems. The fault tree approach represents the failure logic
of the system in an inverted tree structure, and allows for
both qualitative and quantitative system reliability analysis
to take place. The earliest inspection of the analysis of
phased missions was that carried out by Esary and Ziehms
[1]. This research employed a fault tree method by which the
mission is split into consecutive phases whereby each phase
performs a speci ed task. The success of the mission
depends on the performance of the non-repairable compo-
nents used in each phase. The probability of this success is
referred to as the mission reliability. Mission unreliability is
de ned as the probability that the system fails to function
successfully during at least one phase of the mission.
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An important problem is to calculate, as ef ciently as
possible, either the exact value or bounds for the mission
unreliability parameter. Methods to obtain estimates of such
bounds are discussed by Burdick et al. [2].
Situations may be encountered in phased mission analysis
that prevent the assumption of independence between
component failure or repair being made. In such circum-
stances, methods other than fault tree analysis must be
applied. One such technique is the Markov approach [3].
The reliability of a mission may not be obtained by the
simple multiplication of the individual phase reliabilities.
This is due to the fact that, at the phase change times, the
system must occupy a state that allows both of the involved
phases to function. The phases of the mission will be
statistically dependent, and an approach for solution has
been presented by Smotherman and Zemoudeh [4] for
repairable components. Of the many considered solutions
to phased mission problems, simulation techniques typically
offer the greatest generality in representation but are also
often the most expensive in computational requirements.
The Markov method offers a combination of  exibility in
representation and ease of solution but requires transition
rates to be independent of time [5], and suffers from a
potential explosion in the number of state equations for even
moderately sized problems.
In some situations, it will be dif cult to model a system
by fault tree or Markov methods. This type of situation
will occur if a system is too complex to use deterministic
analysis, or if the failure and repair distributions of a
component may not have a constant failure or repair rate.
In such circumstances, simulation may be necessary.
Previous work has concentrated on assessing mission
success. This paper identi es the probability of failure in
each phase. Depending on the phase at which the failure
occurs, the consequences can be signi cantly different.
Having calculated the probability of failure in each phase,
the mission unreliability is simply the sum of the phase
failure probabilities. In reducing the complexity of the
problem in this way, the ef ciency of the approach is
improved. Further improvement can be achieved by emp-
loying modularization methods and the binary decision
diagram (BDD) method. Focus will be restricted to a
system where components are non-repairable.
2 PREVIOUS FAULT TREE METHODS FOR
PHASED MISSIONS
A very simple phased mission problem consisting of
non-repairable components with A, B and C representing
component failures in each of the phases may be used to
demonstrate approaches to phased mission analysis (Fig. 1).
The simple system will enable the features of the
approaches to be understood without complicated
analysis. During phase 1, which lasts until time t1, the
success of the mission is dependent upon the success
of all of the three components A, B and C. Successful
completion of phase 1 means the system then enters phase 2,
which requires component A to function between times t1
and t2, along with at least one of the remaining two
components B and C. The  nal phase requires only one
out of the three components to function between t2 and t3 for
the mission to be accomplished successfully.
Considering the phases as separate systems, the fault
trees to represent individual phase failure are as shown in
Fig. 2. The notation used to represent component failure
in phase i is Ai, Bi, and Ci for components A, B and C
respectively.
The minimal cut sets for each phase when treated as
separate systems are as follow:
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
A A A B C
B B C
C
The method for calculating the reliability of a phased
mission cannot simply be obtained by the multiplication
of the reliabilities of each of the individual phases as this
involves the false assumptions that the phases are indepen-
dent and all components are in the working state at the
beginning of each phase, and results in an appreciable
overprediction of system reliability.
A method proposed by Esary and Ziehms [1] involves
the transformation of a multiphase mission to that of an
equivalent single-phasemission. This transformation process
Fig. 1. Reliability network of a simple phased mission system
Fig. 2. Fault tree representation of individual phase failures
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involves three stages and is only concerned with the failure
of the mission. It does not account for the phase in which
failure occurs. Having expressed the failure causes for each
phase by separate fault trees as in Fig. 2, the transformation
to single phased mission is achieved by:
1. Elimination of unnecessary cut sets. If cut sets of an
earlier phase contain any from a later phase, they may be
removed from the  rst. For example, if the minimal cut
sets for each phase in the mission are:
Phase 1 Phase 2
AB A
CDE CF
then minimal cut set AB can be removed from phase 1 as
A failing in phase 1 means it will still be failed in phase 2
which will cause the mission to fail. This makes the
status of component B irrelevant. In the problem shown
in Fig. 2, it means that minimal cut set A can be removed
from phase 1.
2. Component failure events in each phase fault tree are
replaced by an OR combination of the failure events for
that and all preceding phases. For example, component A
failure in phase 2 would be represented by the OR of the
failure of the component in phase 1, A1, and in phase 2, A2,
since the component is non-repairable (see Fig. 3). [Note
that the replacement is only performed on phase fault trees
that have the eliminated minimal cut sets removed.]
3. Each phase failure is combined using an OR gate to
represent overall mission failure (i.e. the event that any
phase does not complete successfully). This transforms
the original multiphasemission into an equivalent single-
phase mission as shown in Fig. 4. This equivalent single-
phase mission (see Fig. 4) produces different minimal cut
sets than would have resulted from the combination of
the individual phase minimal cut sets.
The process of removing cut sets prior to the construction of
fault trees can generally be seen to reduce the complexity of
the problem for analysis. However, since cuts sets are
removed to produce a single-phase mission, it becomes
impossible to calculate individual phase failure probabil-
ities. Since failures in the different phases may have differ-
ent consequences, it is advantageous if the probability of
failure in any phase can be calculated.
3 PROPOSED FAULT TREE METHOD FOR
PHASED MISSIONS
A new method is proposed that enhances the fault tree
approach in the previous section. It will enable the prob-
ability of failure in each phase to be determined in addition
to the whole mission unreliability. For any phase, the
method combines the causes of success of previous phases
Fig. 3. Replacement OR combination
Fig. 4. Equivalent single-phase mission
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with the causes of failure for the phase being considered to
allow both qualitative and quantitative analysis of both
phase failure and mission failure.
The event of component failure in phase i is again repre-
sented as the event that the component could have failed
during any phase up to and including phase i. System failure
in phase i is represented by the AND of the success of
phases 1 to i-1 and the failure during phase i. (Fig. 5). (Note
that the symbol at the output of the lower events, failure in
phase 1 to i-1, on the left-hand branch is a NOT gate.)
Mission unreliability, QMISS, is then obtained from
QMISS
Xn
i 1
Qi (1)
where Qi is the failure probability in phase i and n is the
total number of phases.
This method allows for the evaluation of individual phase
failures, and also accounts for the condition where compo-
nents are known to have functioned to enable the system to
function in previous phases. However, owing to the fact that
cut sets are not removed until a later stage in the analysis,
the fault tree can be much more complex and require signi-
 cantly more effort to solve.
The failure of a system may occur in many different ways.
Each unique way is referred to as a system failure mode and
involves either the failure of a single component or a
combination of failures of multiple components. To determine
the minimal cut sets of a phase or mission, either a top-down
or a bottom-up approach is applied to the relevant fault tree.
For any phases after the  rst phase, the incorporation of the
success of previous phases means that the fault tree will be
non-coherent and not simply consist of AND and OR gates.
NOT logic will be required to represent this success, and the
combinations of basic events that lead to the occurrence of
the top event are referred to as prime implicants.
This proposed method may be applied for the simple
three-phase mission given in Fig. 1. The fault tree to
represent the initial phase failure of the mission remains
identical to the fault tree representation of the individual
phase failure of phase 1 shown in Fig. 2. Phase 2 failure can
then be shown as the combination of phase 1 success and
failure in phase 2 (Fig. 6). Similarly, phase 3 failure can be
represented as the combination of phase 1 and phase 2
successes, and failure in phase 3 (Fig. 7).
3.1 Fault tree modularization
Fault tree modularization techniques are helpful to reduce
the size of a fault tree to enable prime implicants to be found
more ef ciently. These modularization techniques reduce
both memory and time requirements. A non-coherent exten-
sion of a modularization technique has been employed in
this work [6]. It repeatedly applies the stages of contraction,
factorization and extraction to reduce the complexity of the
fault tree diagram. The phases are identi ed as:
1. Contraction. Subsequent gates of the same type are con-
tracted to form a single gate. The resulting tree structure is
then an alternating sequence of OR and AND gates.
2. Factorization. Identi cation of basic events that always
occur together in the same gate type. The combination of
events and gate type is replaced by a complex event.
However, since NOT logic is included in order to combine
phase success and failure, in this stage the primary basic
events that are found always to occur together in one gate
Fig. 5. Generalised phase failure fault tree Fig. 6. Phase 2 failure fault tree
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type must have complements that always occur together in
the opposite gate type by De Morgans’ laws, e.g.
2000 A B, 2001 A B
2000 A B, 2001 A B
3. Extraction. Searches for structures within the tree of the
form shown in Fig. 8 that may be simpli ed by extracting
an event to a higher level.
3.2 Prime implicants in phased mission systems
Owing to the non-coherent nature of the fault trees, the
combinations of basic events that lead to the occurrence of
the top event of any phase failure are expressed as prime
implicants. The notation used to represent the failure of
component A in phase i is Ai; A¯i represents the functioning
of component A throughout phase i. The notation used to
indicate the failure of a component in phase i to j is Aij, i.e.
the component fails at some time from the start of phase i to
the end of phase j.
This notation makes it possible to de ne a new algebra
over the phases to manipulate the logic equations.What is of
concern in later phases is the time duration (i.e. phases)
during which the component failures occur. Therefore, if a
combination of events for component A is produced
A1 A2(A3 A4)
the top event being developed will only be produced if A
fails in phases 3 or 4, i.e. A34, where
qA34 qA(t2, t4)
…t4
t2
fA(t) dt
and fA(t) is the density function of failure times for
component A.
Fig. 7. Phase 3 failure fault tree
Fig. 8. Extraction stage of the modularization technique
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The new algebraic laws can be summarized as follows:
Ai Ai Ai
Ai Aj 0
Ai Aij Ai
Ai Ai 0
Ai Aij Ai 1, j
Ai Ai 1 Aj Aij
Ai Ai 1 Aj Aij
(2)
Therefore, if two implicant sets contain exactly the same
components where all but one occur over the same time
intervals and the other is a failure in contiguous phases,
the two implicant sets may be combined with the period of
failure for the component with time discrepancy adjusted, e.g.
A1B1
A1B2
A1B12
As the components are non-repairable, the event of compo-
nent failure will only be possible over contiguous phases.
This simpli cation approach therefore allows the prime
implicants for the simple example given in Fig. 1 to be
expressed as follows:
Phase 1
T1 A1 B1 C1
Minimal cut sets:
A1
B1
C1
Phase 2
T2 A1 B1 C1(A1 A2 B1C1 B1C2 B2C1 B2C2)
A1A2B1 C1 A1 B1 C1B2C2
A2B1 C1 A1B2C2
Prime implicants:
A2B1 C1
A1B2C2
Phase 3
T3 A1 B1 C1(A1 A2(B1 B2 C1 C2 ) (A1 A2 A3)
(B1 B2 B3) (C1 C2 C3)
A3B3C23 A3B23C3
Prime implicants:
A3B3C23
A3B23C3
A3B3C2
A3B3C3
A3B2C3
A3B3C3
A3B3C2
A3B3C3
A3B2C3
3.3 Quanti cation
Having established the prime implicants for each phase, they
may now be used to quantify the probability of phase and
mission failure. The unreliability, Qi, for each individual
phase i is found using a simple inclusion–exclusion expan-
sion for the prime implicants Cj in the phase
Qi
XNi
j 1
P(Cj)
XNi
j 1
Xj 1i
k 1
P(Cj Ck ) ( 1)
Ni 1P
(C1 C2 CNi)
Therefore, the event of phase failure for this simple three-
phase mission may be expressed as
Phase 1
Q1 qA1 qB1 qC1 qA1qB1 qA1qC1 qB1qC1
qA1qB1qC1
Phase 2
Q2 qA2(1 qB1 )(1 qC1 ) (1 qA1)qB2qC2 qA2qB2qC2
Phase 3
Q3 qA3qB3qC23 qA3qB23qC3 qA3qB3qC3 (3)
As the failure of each of the phases produces mutually
exclusive causes, the probability of mission failure may be
expressed as the sum of the unreliabilities of the individual
phases
QMISS
Xn
i 1
Qi (4)
For systems with non-repairable components, the expected
number of failures per mission is equal to the mission
unreliability.
4 BINARY DECISION DIAGRAM ANALYSIS
FOR PHASED MISSIONS
A fault tree structure very ef ciently represents system
failure logic but is not an ideal form for mathematical
analysis. Binary decision diagrams represent a logic expres-
sion and offer ef cient mathematical manipulation, although
it is very dif cult to construct directly from the system
de nition. For larger fault trees it is more ef cient to convert
to a BDD prior to analysis. The approach of performing the
quanti cation process after  rst converting the fault tree to a
BDD form offers signi cant advantages for large complex
fault trees. This is particularly true of structures that are
non-coherent, such as the phase failure fault trees.
Figure 9 shows a binary decision diagram. Paths through
the BDD start at the top root node and terminate at one
of two terminal nodes, 1 or 0. A terminal 1 indicates top
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event occurrence and a terminal 0 indicates top event non-
occurrence.
Each node on the diagram corresponds to a basic event in
the fault tree that has to be placed in an ordering prior to
BDD construction. In this case the ordering is A<B<C.
All nodes have two suit branches, a 1 branch corresponds to
component failure and a 0 branch corresponds to a compo-
nent working state.
Prime implicants are given by events on paths through the
diagram that lead to a terminal 1 vertex, i.e.
AB
ABC
In this case, by consensus these can be reduced to minimal
cut sets
AB
AC
since this BDD does not represent a non-coherent system.
More details of qualitative BDD analysis can be found in
reference [7].
4.1 Construction
A binary decision diagram consists of vertices where each
vertex has an if–then–else structure as shown in Fig. 10.
This if–then–else structure is represented in shorthand
(ite) notation as
ite(X1, f 1, f 2)
To combine two basic events using a logical operation !
(where ! represents logical operator AND or OR)
If J ite(X , f 1, f 2)
and H ite(Y , g1, g2)
If X < Y, J H ite(X , f 1 H , f 2 H )
If X Y, J H ite(X , f 1 g1, f 2 g2)
(5)
The basic events in any BDD are represented as A ite(A,1,0)
and A¯ ite(A,0,1). For phased mission systems, the BDD is
constructed so that each component is considered in each
phase (in phase order) before the next basic event is taken
into account.
4.2 Quanti cation
Since each path to a terminal 1 is disjoint, the top event
probability Q is given by
QEXACT
Xn
i 1
p(ri)
where p(ri) is the probability of the ith disjoint path to a
terminal 1. Further details of BDD quanti cation can be
found in reference [8].
4.3 Example
The simple three-phase mission illustrated in Fig. 1 may be
represented in BDD form for each phase and then quanti-
 ed. The fault trees for phase 1 (Fig. 2), phase 2 (Fig. 6) and
phase 3 (Fig. 7) are  rst converted to BDDs. These BDDs
are shown in Figs. 11 to 13 respectively. Their analyses are
presented below.
In BDD methodology, to evaluate the success of a phase
as opposed to the failure, a 1 is replaced by a 0, and a 0 by a 1
for the terminal nodes:
Fig. 9. Binary decision diagram
Fig. 10. Binary decision diagram vertex
Fig. 11. Phase 1 failure BDD
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Phase 1
For phase 1, the ite structure represented by the BDD in
Fig. 11 is
ite(A1, 1, ite(B1, 1, ite(C1, 1, 0)))
Analysis of this BDD gives
Minimal cut sets:
A1
B1
C1
Q1 qA1 (1 qA1)qB1 (1 qA1 )(1 qB1 )qC1
Phase 2
The BDD for failure during phase 2 is given by the
following ite structure
ite(A1, 0, ite(A2, ite(B1, 0, ite(C1, 0, 1)),
ite(B1, 0, ite(B2, ite(C1, 0, ite(C2, 1, 0)), 0))))
For each path to a terminal 1, using the algebra of
events gives
Prime implicants:
A1 A2 B1 C1
A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2
A2 B1 C1
A12 B2 C2
Nodes on a BDD path will represent failure or functioning
of a particular component through different phases. These
must be combined using the algebra of events given earlier,
prior to evaluating the probability of the status required of
that component.
Having considered each component encountered on a
path, the probability of the path to a terminal 1 is evaluated
as usual by taking the product of the probability of the
component status. The phase failure is then obtained by
summing the probability of each disjoint path
Q2 qA2 (1 qB1 )(1 qC1) (1 qA1 qA2 )qB2qC2
Phase 3
The BDD representation for the fault tree representing
failure during phase 3 is
Prime implicants:
A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3 C1 C2 C3
A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3 C1 C2
A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 C1 C2 C3
A3B3C3
A3B3C2
A3B2C3
9>=>;
A3B3C23
A3B23C3
Q3 qA3qB3qC23 qA3qB23qC3 qA3qB3qC3
Therefore, it can be seen that the unreliability of each of the
phases as found by the BDD method is identical to that
obtained using fault tree analysis [equation (3)].
5 CONCLUSIONS
1. The accurate assessment of mission unreliability for
systems with non-repairable components operating over
Fig. 12. Failure during phase 2 BDD
Fig. 13. Failure during Phase 3 BDD
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a sequence of phases can be performed using non-
coherent fault tree structures.
2. The direct quanti cation of the fault trees is frequently
problematic for even moderately sized problems owing to
the size and complexity of the resulting logic functions.
3. Fault tree modularization methods provide some reduc-
tion in the size of the problem but not enough for this
alone to offer a practical solution method.
4. The use of binary decision diagrams (enhanced to account
for the phased nature of component failures) to calculate
the failure probability of each phase in the mission pro-
vides an ef cient and accurate means of evaluating the
mission reliability.
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